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PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff-Appellant First American Commerce Company

is a Utah general partnership of which W. Claude Smith, Francis H.
Suitter, James R. Dickson, Jr., Sam D. Battistone are partners.
Westam Properties, a Utah general partnership, is one of the
general partners of First America Commerce Company but is not
named as a party herein.
2.

Plaintiffs-Appellants W. Claude Smith, Francis H.

Suitter, J. Renee Suitter, James R. Dickson. Jr., Sam D.
Battistone, Carla Nan Battistone, Merrill Turnbow, Kurt Larsen,
Sandra Lynn Larsen, Glenn A. Powell and Carol A. Powell are
individual accommodation makers of the Deed of Trust Note with
limited liability.
Hereinafter, plaintiffs will be collectively referred to
as "First American" or "Plaintiffs."
3.

Defendant-Respondent Washington Mutual Savings Bank

(hereinafter "Washington Mutual") is the holder of the Deed of
Trust Note and the assignee of the Deed of Trust with Assignment
of Rents (Security Agreement included) and other loan documents.
4.

Defendant-Respondent First Security Realty Services

Corporation is the indorser and assignor of the Deed of Trust
Note, Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents (Security Agreement
included), and other loan documents.
Subsequent to the acts giving rise to this lawsuit, First
Security Realty Services Corporation changed its name to Crossland
Mortgage Company.

For purposes of this appeal, the company will

still be referred to as "First Security."
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assignment of its interest in the loan to Washington Mutual, it had
no further obligation or liability with regard to the matters of
which Plaintiffs complain.
By order dated July 9, 1986, the district court granted
First Security's motion to dismiss except as to Plaintiffs' Fourth
Cause of Action, a claim for misrepresentation.
On July 29, 1986, First American filed a Petition for
Review with this court seeking permission to take an interlocutory
appeal from the district court's order.
On September 2, 1986, this court granted First American's
petition.

Statement of Facts
Appellant First American is the owner of a commercial
building and parking facility known as the First American Commerce
Building ("the Building").

On August 29, 1984, First Security

entered into loan agreements with Plaintiffs, including a
promissory note for $5,700,000 (the "Note"), which Note was secured
by a Deed of Trust, Assignment of Leases and Rents, and UCC filings
(collectively referred to as the "Loan Documents").

At closing,

the Note was indorsed and the Loan Documents were assigned to
Washington Mutual.
Actually, First American always contemplated obtaining a
loan from Washington Mutual and dealt with it directly before the
loan was made.

Thus, application for permanent financing requested
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See

Finally, at closing, a settlement statement, prepared by
the title company and signed on behalf of First American, listed
only Washington Mutual as "Lender". (R.64)

Once the loan was

closed, funding came solely from Washington Mutual by wire transfer
from Seattle (R.60).
The causes of action which were dismissed by the court
below (R.203), Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and
Seventh Causes of Action, involved claims that First Security
failed to perform its "obligations" under the Trust Deed to wit:
acting upon Plaintiffs' request for the approval of a proposed
tenant lease requiring alterations to the Building and the
disbursement of tenant improvement funds per the standards set
forth in the Trust Deed.

(R. 5-12).

Each one of these

obligations, if such they were, was owed by "Beneficiary" under the
Trust Deed.

Section 1.17 of the Trust Deed states that "[t]he term

'Beneficiary' shall mean the owner and holder of the Note, whether
or not named as Beneficiary herein."

(R. 162) Following the

execution of the Assignment and the indorsement of the Note by
First Security to Washington Mutual (R. 67), which were
accomplished with the knowledge and consent of Appellant,
Washington Mutual was at all times, and continues to be, the sole
owner and holder of the Note.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants urge an incorrect standard of review upon this
court and, under the correct standard, have failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
-4-

By the express terms of the Trust Deed, Beneficiary is
defined as "the owner and holder of the Note."

Washington Mutual,

being the sole owner and holder of the Note, is the sole
Beneficiary under the Trust Deed and the only party capable of
performing the duties of which Plaintiffs complain and the only
party liable for any breach of duty.
Plaintiffs rely on the principle of contract law that a
party cannot, by an assignment of the contract, relieve itself of
its obligations thereunder to support their argument that First
Security retained its obligations as Beneficiary notwithstanding
the Assignment.

Although a correct statement of general contract

law, this principle has no application in the context of a contract
whose subject is the security for a loan.

Once a secured party

transfers its interest in the debt, it also, as a matter of law,
transfers its interest in the security for the debt.

As First

Security no longer held any interest in the subject property, it
could not retain the duties of a secured party with respect to such
property.

The trial court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims

against First Security should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS URGE UPON THE COURT AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Appellant, citing Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 300

(Utah 1978), argues that in reviewing the record on appeal, "this
court must treat the evidence First American submitted as the only
credible evidence and affirm the summary judgment only if no issues

-5-

of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned."
Appellants' Brief at 6.

Such is not the law of Utah.

The reported

decision in Blodgett v. Martsch is an opinion signed only by
Justice Maughan.

Chief Justice Ellett concurred in the result,

Justice Crockett concurred by separate opinion, and Justice Hall,
joined by Justice Wilkins, concurred with reservation by separate
opinion.

None of the other opinions explicitly adopted the

questionable standard of review.

Thus, the decision is not

authority for the standard of review.

Indeed, this Court, in a

later opinion held that, in reviewing a summary judgment, the
Supreme Court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and affirm only where it appears
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, or where, even
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving
party is entitled to summary judgment as as a matter of law.
v. Seagull Enterprises Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979).

Themy

First

Security submits that this case satisfies those conditions and thus
the District Court's decision granting partial summary judgment
should be affirmed.
II. PLAINTIFFS RAISED NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT BEFORE THE
DISTRICT COURT.
There can be no dispute as to any of the material facts
presented above.

They are clearly set forth in documents

presented to the court below.

Plaintiffs do not quibble with the

documents; instead, their Brief obfuscates by pointing to the
affidavit of Mr. Merrill Turnbow, quoting the following assertion:
-6-

Although plaintiff First American Commerce
Company was aware that First American Commerce
made an assignment with respect to the subject
loan to Washington Mutual, neither First American
nor any other plaintiff agreed to release First
Security from any of its obligations under the
loan documents, nor did any of them enter into a
novation of any of the loan documents. At all
times plaintiffs have considered, and still do
consider, First Security to be the lender on the
subject loan and to be fully responsible to meet
all of its obligations stated in the loan
documents.
Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 9.

Plaintiffs argue that this affidavit,

with nothing more, shows that Plaintiffs neither released First
Security from the obligations under the Loan Documents nor entered
into a novation, and that "there was no evidence to the contrary."
These arguments, even if viewed as "credible" in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs, offer no reason to upset the District
Court's ruling.

An affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible into
evidence.

Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).

The only

fact in the quoted portion of the Turnbow affidavit is an admission
that First American was aware of the Assignment of the loan by
First Security to Washington Mutual.

Interestingly, in its Brief

to this Court (p.3), and contrary to its pleading (R.4), Appellant
has for the first time admitted that it consented to such
Assignment.

Whether or not there was a release of First Security

or a novation is not a fact, but a legal conclusion which is for
the court, not the Appellants, to decide.

Finally, the role in

which First American views First Security, without any evidence of

-7-

communications to that effect, is merely another opinion.

Bare

contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in support
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude the
entry of summary judgment.

Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d

937, 938 (Utah 1980).
In short, in response to unambiguous documents in the
record and before the court below, Appellant has offered opinions
of the legal impact of those documents.

Besides the fact that

these opinions are not facts, Plaintiffs' unstated intentions as to
the meaning of the documents are irrelevant.

Interpretation of a

contract is a question of law to be determined by the Court.

E.g.,

Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199
(Utah 1983).

As there are thus no material facts at issue, this

Court must then decide whether the District Court correctly ruled
that, as a matter of law, First Security was entitled to partial
summary judgment.
III. FIRST SECURITY WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

Under the Clear Language of the Trust Deed, Washington
Mutual Supplanted First Security as the Beneficiary.
As noted above, interpretation of a contract's language

is a matter of law to be decided by the court.

Under the clear

and unambiguous language of Section 1.17 of the Trust Deed, the
Beneficiary is defined as "the owner and holder of the Note."
At the closing, after the Loan Documents were executed,
First Security indorsed the Note (R.67) and assigned the Loan

-8-

Documents (R.22) to Washington Mutual.

The unconditional

Assignment made Washington Mutual the owner of the Note; the
indorsement and delivery of the Note made Washington Mutual the
holder.

Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-3-202. Being the owner and holder

of the Note made Washington Mutual the only party that could be
deemed "Beneficiary" of the Trust Deed.
First American, however, argues that notwithstanding the
fact of Washington Mutual's being the Beneficiary under the Trust
Deed and notwithstanding First Security's assigning all of its
right, title and interest in the Loan Documents, First Security
retained its obligations to First American under the Loan
Documents, and thus remains liable for breach of these
obligations.

The District Court correctly rejected such an

argument.
B.

The General Contract Principle Relied On By Appellant Is
Inapplicable To This Case.
In support of its argument, Plaintiffs cite the general

contract principle that a party to a contract cannot relieve itself
of its obligations under the contract merely by assigning the
contract to a third person; to do so requires a release by the
other party to the contract or a novation.

Although the District

Court could well have held as a matter of law that a novation
occurred, it did not, and did not need to do so, because the
general principle is inapplicable in this case.

In view of

plaintiffs' studied refusal to acknowledge that they always looked
to Washington Mutual as the lender rather than to First Security, a

-9-

brief word about novation is instructive in disposing of
Plaintiffs' insistence upon suing First Security.
This Court has held a novation (which has been defined as
"the replacement of an unexpired contract by another contract
reached through renegotiation, or the substitution of a new party
with the concurrent release of an original party from liability,"
Williams Petroleum Co. v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 679 F.2d 815,
819 (10th Cir. 1982)) need not be express or written, but could be
implied from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.

Robison v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867 (Utah 1979).

Given the

undisputed facts, as shown by the documents in the record cited
herein concerning Plaintiffs' dealings with Washington Mutual prior
to the loan, Appellant's knowledge of and consent to First
Security's immediate assignment of the loan to Washington Mutual at
closing, and Washington Mutual's funding of the loan, the District
Court would have been within its powers to have found an implied
novation, with Washington Mutual substituting as lender, thereby
releasing First Security from its obligations under the Loan
Documents.
Had the District Court made such a finding, Plaintiffs,
even under the argument presented in their Brief, would have to
agree that the District Court correctly dismissed their claims
against First Security.

The court did not need to make such a

finding, however, because by its assignment of the Loan Documents,
First Security was released from the obligations that Plaintiffs
claims were breached by operation of law.
-10-

Each of the cases cited by Appellant involves a bilateral
contract whereby one party is to provide a service or a product to
another in return for payment.

Upon assigning its right to

payment, the party that was to provide the product or service
remains liable for breached obligations concerning the service or
product, unless it obtained a release from the party with whom it
originally contracted.

See Cuchine v. H. 0. Bell, Inc., 682 P.2d

723 (Mont. 1984) (retail installment sale of truck); Mt. Wheeler
Power, Inc. v. Gallagher, 653 P.2d 1212 (Nev. 1982) (sale of
electricity); Smith v. Wrehe, 261 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 1978) (sale of
taxicab company); D. A. Taylor Co. v. Paulson, 552 P.2d 1274 (Utah
1976) (sale of carpet); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music
Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1977) (royalty agreement concerning
recording and record distribution contract); Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company v. Rental Storage and Transit Company, 524 S.W.2d
898 (Mo. App. 1975) (agreement between railroad company and
shippers concerning use of tracks).

The purpose for such contracts

is to ensure that one party is provided a service or product, and
that the other party is paid.

In such cases, it is entirely

appropriate that the party that originally promised to provide the
service or product remains liable on its obligations to do so, even
though it has assigned its rights to payment.
This case, however, involves a completely different sort
of contract.

Here (even assuming arguendo that First Security

funded the loan and then assigned it to Washington Mutual),

-11-

Beneficiary (First Security) loans money to Trustor (First
American), and in return is granted a lien on property owned by
Trustor.

The contract at issue here, the Trust Deed, concerns the

parties' obligations to each other concerning treatment and use of
collateral, in this case the Building.

Thus, for example, the

Trust Deed states that Trustor will not sell, transfer or alter the
Building, or any part thereof, without Beneficiary's consent.
Correspondingly, Beneficiary will not unreasonably withhold its
consent to proposals by Trustor to sell, transfer or alter the
collateral.

The first provision is designed to protect Beneficiary

by insuring that its debtor's fee interest to the Building will not
disappear, and that the Building will not be rendered less valuable
by virtue of alteration before the debt is paid.

The second

provision is intended to protect Trustor; since it is in possession
of the Building, and is operating it, it must be able to use the
collateral in a reasonable fashion without Beneficiary's
unreasonable interference in that use.
In short, these provisions are designed to insure that
Trustor will continue to protect the collateral, and Beneficiary
will not unreasonably "overprotect" the collateral.

There is no

payment for either service; the obligations, and the contract
itself, only have meaning insofar as they relate to collateral
securing a loan.

Stated another way, the only parties that have

obligations to each other concerning the collateral must be holders
of rights in that collateral:

the owner and the secured party.

Appellants argue that when the secured party unconditionally
-12-

assigns its interest in the loan, thereby transferring its interest
in the security for that loan, UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-35, the
original lender retains its obligations under the security
agreement to the debtor not to "overprotect" the collateral.

This

is illogical, because the original lender no longer holds any
rights in the collateral to "overprotect".

The fact that the Trust

Deed in this case specifically defines Beneficiary as "the holder
and owner of the Note" only serves to reinforce the logic of the
notion that only insofar as a secured party retains rights in
collateral does it retain obligations concerning treatment of such
collateral to the grantor of the security interest.
Decisions in analogous fact situations, namely federally
insured mortgages, where in order to collect the insurance proceeds
the original lender/mortgagee must assign its rights in the
mortgage to the agency/insurer, support this proposition.

In

Marcus Garvey Square, Inc. v. Winston Burnett Construction Co. of
California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1979), an owner of a
housing project brought suit against a general contractor seeking
damages for late construction.

The contractor (Burnett), in turn,

counterclaimed and crossclaimed against the owner, the mortgage
lender, and several federal agencies seeking to recover the balance
allegedly due under the construction contract.

Under federal

statutory law, in order to receive its mortgage insurance benefits,
the mortgage lender, Home Savings and Loan, Inc., assigned the
mortgage to the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.

In affirming the lower court's grant of summary
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judgment for Home Savings against the contractor's claims, the
Ninth Circuit stated:
[T]he district court was correct in granting
summary judgment in favor of Home. All Home's
rights and interests arising under this mortgage
have been assigned to the Secretary [of HUD], 12
U.S.C., § 1713(g), as incorporated by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-3(a)(2). Whatever claims Burnett has
against Home must be asserted against the
Secretary; Home is no longer liable to suit upon
them. (Emphasis added).
595 F.2d at 1133.

Likewise, in Trans-Bay Engineers & Builders,

Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the D.C. Circuit
upheld the dismissal of claims to recover "holdback" funds brought
by a general contractor against the mortgagee and the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development.

The mortgagee had assigned its

interest in the loan documents to HUD.

The opinion states:

The District Court correctly dismissed all
counts against the Advance Mortgage Corp.
Advance assigned the mortgage and the Building
Loan Agreement to HUD on December 24, 1974, and
thereby transferred all rights and interests
arising under the mortgage to HUD, pursuant to 12
U.S.C. § 1713(g). HUD is in a position to
advance any arguments that Advance might have
presented in this case, and HUD admits that it is
bound as a successor in interest to honor any
obligations owed by Advance.
551 F.2d at 383.

See also F. W. Eversley & Co., Inc. v. East New

York Non-Profit HDFC, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(summary judgment granted in favor of mortgagee who had assigned
loan documents to government; mortgagee "no longer liable"); Lindy
v. Lynn, 395 F. Supp. 769, 773 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd 515 F.2d 507
(3rd Cir. 1975) (following assignment of mortgage to Secretary of
HUD, the "Secretary is now the alter ego of the mortgagee and as
-14-

such is clothed with all the rights and obligations contained in
the aforementioned agreements."

(Emphasis added)).

In all of these cases, the assignment of the mortgage was
sufficient to sustain summary judgment for the assignor/mortgagee
on claims relating to duties under the mortgage.

None of these

opinions follows the general rule relied on by Plaintiffs because
it makes no sense to do so.

The logical party that would have

obligations to a debtor relating to the debtor's use of pledged
property is the party that has rights in that collateral, i.e.,
the secured party.
The facts of this case amply demonstrate the fallacy of
Appellant's argument.

Appellant contends that First Security is

liable because it unreasonably withheld its consent to a lease on
the property securing the loan.

Putting aside the question of

whether the Beneficiary's consent to such a lease was necessary at
all, to imply such an obligation on First Security would fly in
the face of the Loan Documents, the Assignment, logic, and common
sense.

First Security's consent to such a lease would be

meaningless because it no longer held any rights in the property
being leased.

After closing, Washington Mutual was the only party

who held a lien on the Building and thus was the only party whose
consent concerning a lease could make any difference to First
American.
For these reasons, Washington Mutual is the sole party of
whom Fist American can complain for the alleged failures to
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approve a tenant lease and to disburse tenant improvement funds
pursuant to the Trust Deed.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts in the case are that First Security
signed the Loan Documents, including a Note and Trust Deed, with
Plaintiffs.

First Security, with the knowledge and consent of

Plaintiffs, immediately and unconditionally indorsed the Note and
assigned all of its right, title and interest in and to such Loan
Documents to Washington Mutual.

The Trust Deed provides for

certain obligations on the part of Beneficiary, which is defined
in the Trust Deed as the holder and owner of the Note.

At all

times following the assignment by First Security, Washington
Mutual has been the sole holder and owner of the Note, and thus
the sole Beneficiary under the Trust Deed.
As there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,
and since by operation of law First Security was relieved of its
obligations under the Trust Deed upon its indorsement of the Note
and assignment of the Loan Documents to Washington Mutual, the
District Court's granting of partial summary judgment for First
Security should be affirmed.
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